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NON-PLACES AND THE LAW: A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
Abstract. In the context of the significant literature on Marc Augé’s concept of non-places, 
including its various applications in different disciplines, and also constantly growing legal 
geographical analyses, it is striking that, to date, there have been no more focused discussion on 
non-places and the law. This paper aims to begin filling this noticeable gap. It focuses on an original 
presentation of Augé’s concept and distinguishes three levels of non-places: their objective, material 
level (e.g. the buildings of non-places); the intersubjective, social level (the specific, distinctive 
feel of non-places, such as anonymity and detachment); and the purely individual, subjective level 
(the way particular people assess a specific non-place). The paper not only argues that Augé is 
already sensitive to the law in his original account of non-places, but also that the law – while 
directly irrelevant for the subjective level – is nevertheless very important for the objective and 
intersubjective levels of non-places, as, ultimately, it is a co-constituting factor of these aspects of 
the discussed type of sites.
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NIE-MIEJSCA I PRAWO: WSTĘPNE ROZWAŻANIA
Streszczenie. W kontekście obszernej literatury na temat koncepcji nie-miejsc Marca Augé, 
włącznie z jej wieloma aplikacjami w różnych dziedzinach, a także stale rozwijanych geograficzno-
-prawnych analiz, zaskakujące jest, że dotąd nie przeprowadzono bardziej skupionej dyskusji nad 
nie-miejscami i prawem. Celem tego artykułu jest rozpoczęcie wypełniania tej luki. Skupia się on na 
oryginalnym ujęciu koncepcji Augé i wyróżnia trzy poziomy nie-miejsc: ich obiektywny, materialny 
poziom (np. budynki nie-miejsc); intersubiektywny, społeczny poziom (specyficzna, wyróżniająca 
atmosfera nie-miejsc, taka jak panująca w nich anonimowość i poczucie zdystansowania), oraz 
wyłącznie indywidualny, subiektywny poziom (to, jak poszczególni ludzie oceniają konkretne nie-
-miejsce). W artykule przekonuje się nie tylko do tego, że Augé jest uwrażliwiony na prawo już 
w jego pierwotnym ujęciu nie-miejsc. Ponadto prawo – jakkolwiek bezpośrednio nieistotne dla 
subiektywnego poziomu – jest bardzo ważne dla poziomów obiektywnego i intersubiektywnego nie- 
-miejsc, jako, ostatecznie, czynnik współkonstytuujący te aspekty komentowanego rodzaju miejsc.
Słowa kluczowe: zwrot przestrzenny, geografia prawna, Marc Augé, nie-miejsca, prawo.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The general aim of this short study is to present a preliminary look at 
and discussion of Marc Augé’s concept of non-places, based on its fullest 
account, which was originally expressed in 1992 in Non-lieux, introduction 
à une anthropologie de la surmodernité [Non-Places: An Introduction 
to Supermodernity] (Augé 2008 – second edition of English translation), from 
the broadly understood socio-spatio-legal perspective. Specifically, hereinafter 
one argues that not only was this particular perspective previously absent in the 
nonetheless quite significant and still growing scholarship on non-places, but also 
that Augé’s original account of non-places seems already to be informed by a very 
basic kind of sensitivity to legal context. Further elaboration of this sensitivity 
allows for the proposal of a new way of explaining this quite often misunderstood 
concept and helps us to grasp it, which is no easy task, given the complexity of 
Augé’s narrative. At the same time, a general account of the law’s important and, 
to a certain extent, even constitutive role for non-places is presented and explained. 
Such an attempt to show a neglected legal dimension of Augé’s influential concept 
proves that it can still be thought-provoking and that there are aspects of it which 
have yet to be thoroughly discussed, almost 30 years after the original French 
publication of Augé’s essay.
However, in the face of the impressive development of legal geography, and 
especially considering its relatively recent highly original theoretical frameworks 
(e.g. Delaney 2010; Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos 2015), one must admit that the 
proposed introductory conceptualization of the intersection of non-places and 
the law is only one of many possible approaches. In no way do ideas below rule 
out any other accounts of the title relationship that can be created within various 
legal–geographical frameworks; rather, the paper encourages such an enterprise. 
In the end, this study should be thought of as an invitation to begin considering the 
non-places–law nexus. Both elements of this relationship are extremely complex, 
thus it would be naive to assume that a short, even basic study can cover all of the 
subtle details of the issue. However, the first step in showing and understanding 
how non-places and the law relate to one another must be taken.
2. THE BASICS AND NON-BASICS OF NON-PLACES
Even though the concept of non-places was already proposed and used before 
Augé did so (e.g. Augé 2008, 69), it is he who popularized the concept and gave 
it the meaning most-known today and more or less faithfully employed by a wide 
range of scholars representing various disciplines. The basic, most general thesis 
of Augé (2008, 28) is that, today, one experiences a proliferation of non-places 
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that are opposed to the category of anthropological/sociological places. The latter 
are defined by the particular culture localized in a given time and space and by 
the specific functions they fulfill with regard to individuals (Augé 2008, 42–43). 
Namely, places are a source of meaning and have significance for those who 
inhabit them. They have a historical, sometimes even highly intimate, character 
for those who identify themselves through these sites and their relationship 
to them. By contrast, non-places lack features of identification, relationality, and 
historicity (Augé 2008, 63–64). Not only are they understood negatively regarding 
anthropological places, they also fulfill a completely different set of functions. 
To name just few of the most typical examples, non-places make fast movements/
transitions possible (e.g. highways, airports), but are also suitable for temporary 
stays (e.g. global chain hotels/motels, but also refugee camps) and consumption 
(e.g. shopping malls, global chain supermarkets) (Augé 2008, 28).
Even though one might get the impression that places and non-places are 
fixed, objective categories, in the end, they can and should be understood as 
idealizations – two extreme points on one axis that do not exist in reality in 
a pure form (Augé 2008, 64). Namely, Augé (2008, 44) himself complicates this 
distinction when he explains the concept of historicity, a feature of places, not 
non-places. According to him, a place fulfills its condition of historicity if it is 
outside the scope of history understood as a science. Next, Augé (2008, 45–46) 
stresses that an anthropological place is basically subjective; it is an individual’s 
image of his or her relationship with a certain site. As one might easily guess, due 
to “the two sides of the same coin” character of the places/non-places distinction, 
the same can be said of non-places. However, the experiencing of these sites is not 
constituted through the sense of identity, relationship, and history (outside history 
textbooks), but through a sense of detachment, solitude, anonymity, similarity, 
or even sameness and specific deindividualization (Augé 2008, 83). Individuals 
in non-places consider themselves as only one of many nearly identical people. 
One can say that, to consider a certain site as a non-place with regard to a given 
individual, the person has to have the impression that in this site, she or he is not 
a “one and only,” but just “one of the many” of the same kind.
In his later writing, Augé does not commit the same specific mistake (see 
Introduction to the Second Edition, Augé 2008, VIII), but in light of his original 
essay, one might actually get the impression that, in non-places, there are only 
visitors. Significantly, Augé seems to neglect the obvious fact that, besides visitors 
or users (e.g. travelers or customers) in non-places, there are also inhabitants of 
these sites (broadly understood, but internally very diverse staff members or 
service providers) whose behaviors toward visitors are a significant medium for 
the experiencing of the non-place among the latter. For an “insider,” something 
so standardized, schematized, and fitting regarding the general account of the 
non-place, such as an enormous international airport, can still be regarded as an 
anthropological place. In the end, the airport staff, or those who work for global 
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chain hotels, are much more familiar with these specific environments. Their 
relationships with these sites are also markedly different than those experienced 
by “outsiders,” who simply use or pass through them, but do not “dwell” in them. 
Thus, quite understandably, one can safely say that a given site can be regarded at 
once by some as place and by others as a non-place.
This general remark fits perfectly well with the subjective character of place/
non-place distinction that Augé stresses in many parts of his essay. Nevertheless, 
it would be a mistake to emphasize only the subjective character of places and 
non-places, giving the impression that they are one-dimensional and that their 
specific ontologies can be reduced to just the individual’s experience. In the end, 
individuals’ approaches constituting a place or non-place always refer to something 
objective, “extra-experiential,” to some actual physical, architectural creation and 
setting. Accordingly, one can speak of the dual character of places and non-places. 
They are material, externally observable creations and kinds of relationships given 
individuals have with them. In other words, they are objective, physical formations 
and their subjective experiences. As mentioned above, non-places are defined 
by the very specific senses of anonymity, solitude, and deindividualization felt by 
particular individuals regarding these sites. 
However, when one looks at the list of experiences that define non-places 
according to Augé, one might start to wonder: do notions of similarity, detachment, 
or the other characteristics mentioned above actually refer purely to individual, 
subjective evaluations, or are they, in fact, more objective – or to be more precise, 
intersubjective – characterizations of social relationships in sites described as non-
places? To put it differently, is the sense of being just one of many of the same 
kind, and not the one and only really an only individual experience, or is it more 
general social regularity, a characteristic of a large part of social interactions in 
non-places that affects many individuals in a similar way, but who can, in the end, 
assess it differently? Namely, for one person, the anonymity, solitude, and specific 
traveler’s sense of self-centeredness, which are in a way inherent in large modern 
international airports, can be very soothing, while for another person they can be 
simply unnerving.
This conclusion can even allow us to say that, in fact, non-places have triple 
character, a quite complex ontology. They can be described as being based in 
objective, actual physical creations and settings where many intersubjective, social 
relationships can be characterized by similarity, mutual anonymity, or sometimes 
even disinterest. These, in turn, can be and are differently evaluated from totally 
subjective, individual perspectives of some of the people in these sites (this triple 
model is inspired by the distinction of material, social, and mental spaces used 
by Blank and Rosen-Zvi 2010). Following this suggestion of non-places’ triple 
character can be useful in the elaboration of the relationship between non-places 
and the law. However, before proceeding to this main task, a few more general 
remarks are warranted.
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3. CONTEXT AND AIM OF THE STUDY
Even though, or maybe just because, Augé’s account of non-places can be 
regarded as quite vague and open to different interpretations, and thus full of 
controversy, this concept made a tremendous career. It is commented on and 
discussed, usually outside any particular context, in a more general, conceptual 
manner as a research topic in itself (e.g. Bosteels 2003; Merriman 2009). It is 
also compared with other more or less well-known spatial concepts in the social 
sciences and humanities, such as Michel Foucault’s heterotopia (e.g. Czaja 2013) 
or Edward Relph’s placelessness (e.g. Freestone and Liu 2016) and used in more 
specific research areas, such as globalization (e.g. Ritzer 2007), literary and film 
studies (e.g. Gebauer et al. 2015), or design (e.g. Coyne and Stewart 2007). This is 
still a far from exhaustive enumeration, because Augé’s non-places even inform 
some diverse empirical research and are used in a wide array of case studies in 
different disciplines and subdisciplines (e.g. Fitzgerald and Robertson 2006; Tawil-
Souri 2011; Costas 2013).
This proves, quite undeniably, that non-places are a truly thought-provoking 
concept of impressive “bearing capacity.” In the end, Augé’s notion is employed 
in very different contexts. However, sometimes one might get the quite justified 
impression that some authors do not use it faithfully, but instead simply amend this 
general concept to serve their own research goals, which seems to be caused by 
the intricacy of Augé’s argumentation style. Whether similar amendments to the 
concept of non-places are made in the case of the present study is, naturally, open 
to discussion.
Nevertheless, in the face of the staggering number of comments and 
applications of the non-places concept, what is most striking is the absence of 
its analysis from the broadly understood legal perspective. Representatives 
of the legal sciences seem to be completely oblivious to Augé’s most famous 
work. Moreover and more specifically, dynamically developing analyses of the 
spatial dimension of the law and legal phenomena (i.e. legal geography or law 
and geography studies, which can be regarded as a part of a wider spatial turn 
in social sciences and humanities) also do not seriously take into account this 
influential concept. Even when non-places are actually referred to, they are still 
treated very perfunctorily (e.g. English 2003, 470; Cohen 2008, 193–194; Anders 
2009, 137; Whitecross 2009, 58; Young 2014, 130; Maniscalco 2015, 198, 208, 
221; Barr 2016, 18, 187; Dahlberg 2016, 22). Naturally, one might say in response 
to this that there is nothing interesting about non-places, from a legal perspective. 
Perhaps not much is said about non-places and the law because there is simply 
nothing to say about it.
Although this or other similar approaches are possible to take, they are flawed 
and misguided. Namely, sites popularly described as examples of non-places 
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(for instance, airports or refugee camps) seem to be interesting areas of specific 
socio-legal phenomena, such as micro-jurisdictional differences in comparison 
to a state’s jurisdiction – as, in the end, non-places can be regarded as sites under 
a nation-state’s jurisdiction that have their own legal peculiarities unknown 
to other distinguishable sites in the given state – but also, or even more importantly, 
the law appears to be specifically constitutive for them. This is exactly the aim 
of the presented study: to reveal and try to explain one particular approach to the 
legal dimension of or the law’s importance for non-places. This feature of the 
“legality” of the non-places concept – hitherto neglected in various discussions 
on it – is even something Augé suggests between the lines, though he and other 
scholars (including sociologists of law and legal geographers) never elaborate on it. 
The elaboration of this feature begins with general remarks about non-places and 
the law – references to some of the “law’s traces” found in Augé’s original essay.
4. NON-PLACES AND THE LAW – GENERAL REMARKS
When one thinks about the intersection of non-places and the law, one might 
first look at the original French notion of non-lieu. Not only does this word mean 
“non-place,” it also, and even more commonly, is the legal notion of the dismissal of 
a case, often because of a lack of grounds for prosecution (Augé 2008, 82, footnote 6).
Next to this additional and purely legal meaning of the original, French notion 
of non-lieu, one can easily find in Augé’s account other, even more convincing 
arguments that justify the enterprise proposed in this paper: an effort trying 
to map the relevance of the law for non-places. Namely, Augé (2008, 43) explicitly 
states that broadly understood spatial structures correspond to some sort of rules. 
To put it differently, physical sites for human activity are co-constituted (with other 
factors) by social norms, regardless of whether these norms are customary, moral, 
religious, or legal. Spaces people inhabit or merely pass through have specific 
identities and can be distinguished from one another, not only because of their 
objective, visible, physical features, but also because of the fact that, for instance, 
in one type of space some activity can be even explicitly proscribed, whereas in 
another type the same activity can be normatively irrelevant (also, this can occur 
within one national legal jurisdiction). Needless to say, such an idea seems to be 
one of the fundamental assumptions for legal geography. As a consequence, non-
places should also have some specific rules that co-constitute them and how they 
are experienced. Luckily, one does not have to guess about them, because Augé is 
remarkably clear when it comes to the issue in question.
Augé (2008, 77–78) argues that non-places, such as highways, global chain 
shopping malls or supermarkets, motels and hotels, and airports, define themselves 
and function through normative messages. Non-places are co-constituted through 
rather clear, non-ambiguous, and often strict rules (for example, interfering in 
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one’s privacy) for functioning in them. These rules – expressed textually or 
visually – are addressed particularly to those who visit or pass through them.
What can and should be added to the very basic normative, rule-centered 
characteristics of non-places in Augé’s original account is a stressing of the 
following. The mentioned normative messages either resemble legal rules or simply 
are legal rules created by legislative bodies explicitly for the sake of sites that can 
be characterized as non-places. To acknowledge this, consider the legal regulations 
concerning traveling on highways in a given country; the complex web of rules of 
conduct in an international airport, where international aviation associations and 
national and often internal (specific to a given airport) regulations intertwine; or the 
plethora of written, but also strictly visual, instructions for hotel guests.
Moreover, this particular remark requires us to refer once again to the issue 
of micro jurisdictions, suggested earlier, and to consider the following. There 
are general laws over the state territory in which a given non-place is physically 
located, and this non-place has its own characteristic legal rules or rules with some 
legitimizing foundation in official law that do not function outside the non-place 
in question. In other words, one can say that non-places often require from their 
users or passersby things that are not expected of them in any manner, not only 
– in Augéan terms – in more intimate, personal anthropological places, but also
in sites that are usually conceptualized as instances of public places. In the sites 
of these last two types, there are also some rules that are relevant for them, yet 
often they are non-legal or, even if they are legal written rules, they are still not so 
specific, detailed, and miniscule as those in non-places.
The above is only a preliminary discussion, yet it shows that there is some 
legal relevance to non-places. Briefly, the French explicitly legal understanding of 
the notion of non-lieu and Augé’s clear and unambiguous comments on the general 
spatiality–rules nexus, coupled with some basic characteristics of non-places’ 
specific normative messages, that can be further described as generally legal or 
legal-like and not functioning outside the given non-places. Often, these are more 
detailed and even more demanding than the rules co-constituting other types of 
sites. However, there is more to say about non-places and the law than simply these 
general remarks. Namely, one can propose discussing the law’s relevance for non-
places in a more ordered, organized way, yet still retain a considerably high degree of 
generality, with the use of the already-suggested triple understanding of non-places.
5. NON-PLACES AND THE LAW – SPECIFIC REMARKS
Even though Augé proposes understanding non-places in terms of actual, 
material, physical sites, in addition to the individual, subjective relations particular 
persons can have with these sites (seen most explicitly in Augé 1999, 106, 109), 
one can argue that he should also clearly take into account a specific intermediary 
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between the objective and subjective levels of non-places. Namely, non-places 
are not only distinctive in comparison to other kinds of sites for human activity, 
because of their physical forms and appearances and the ways people relate 
to them, but also because interpersonal, intersubjective relations, those interactions 
people most usually engage in in non-places, are very specific. In other words, 
non-places are not only highly visually and architectonically standardized and 
leading their visitors to particular feelings or emotions (or a lack of them). They 
are also marked by some specific social, interactional features – not purely 
individual subjective experiences of these sites, but their traits, beyond the mere 
physicality, that can similarly affect whole masses of people who use or pass 
through non-places.
In consequence, one can analytically distinguish three levels of non-
places. First, the objective level is about non-places as concrete material, 
architectural objects, buildings’ exteriors and interiors in all their complexity 
and multifacetedness. Second, the intersubjective level concerns relatively 
common features of social relations that most typically happen in non-places 
and thus influence a plethora of individuals using or passing through these sites 
in a very similar way – many see or encounter the same things and situations 
in non-places. Third, the subjective level refers to purely individual, personal 
evaluations or experiences of non-places by a given person, ones that can even be 
quite surprising, in light of the specific non-place’s objective and intersubjective 
levels and how other people individually assess the particular site. For instance, 
a specific visitor can be very satisfied by a given non-place, such as its appearance 
and the predominant characteristics of the social relations that happen within it, 
whereas other visitors who encounter the same things and situations assess them 
completely differently. This basic triple vision of the non-place, which can be 
interpreted from Augé’s writings on non-places, is useful in discussion of non-
places and the law, as called for in this paper. The subsequent subsections address 
the issue of how the broadly understood law relates to non-places or, to be more 
precise, to each of their analytically distinguished levels. 
5.1. Non-Places’ Objective Level and the Law
The law’s relevance for the objective level of non-places is the easiest 
to address. In the end, one can simply say that the law, with its specific regulations 
concerning building construction, standards to be realized, or even building 
permits alone, actually plays a significant role for non-places in their most basic 
sense of specific constructions where different kinds of interactions happen 
and particular issues are taken care of by people. In short, the law regulates the 
physical creation of non-places and even, to a certain degree, their subsequent 
material maintenance. Without construction regulations and a wide array of legally 
determined standards and requirements that are periodically controlled, building 
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permits and other kinds of public administration institutions’ legal involvement, 
including public procurement procedures, it is hard to imagine the creation and 
existence of a non-place as a building or a broader material infrastructure.
Having said that, one should stress that the above does not mean that the law’s 
influence on non-places’ objective level is so all-encompassing that it determines 
the entirety of it. The law is, indeed, fundamental to non-places’ physical 
existence, but through the law one simply cannot explain all of the multifaceted 
material details of these sites, such as those that can be seen (e.g. sizes and colors 
of fonts used in signs, or decorative elements like fountains or statues), touched 
(e.g. handrails), heard (e.g. intercom messages or Muzak), or even smelled by 
those present (e.g. air fresheners). In the end, such details, which in conjunction 
constitute the broadly understood exteriors and interiors of non-places, are 
ultimately determined by extra-legal factors, including architectural norms, design 
paradigms, fashions or trends popular at the moment, more general aesthetic 
tastes, financial capabilities, and the products and services actually offered by 
potential contractors who may be chosen to complete the construction of a given 
non-place. The broadly understood aesthetics and material functionality of non-
places, including their non-human constituents that can be grasped by human 
senses, are not completely irrelevant to the law, but the law does not determine 
these aspects thoroughly, to the most miniscule detail. This leads to the following. 
Even at their most basic, objective level, non-places are too complex and detailed 
to be explained exhaustively with reference to the law, although the law is still, 
to a certain considerable extent, relevant for this particular level of them.
When speaking of experiencing non-places, one must stress that they are not 
hollow, lifeless objects, whose experiencing is similar to being alone in an empty 
room or building, when a person can observe all the material aspects of a given 
site, with no actual interpersonal interactions in it. On the contrary, for a non-place 
to actually be a non-place, its specific aesthetics or material functionality are not 
enough. Next to aesthetics and functionality, there must be some specific social 
relations, that is, interactions between people within the non-place that are merely 
instrumental to or are actually a realization of the main, intended functions of the 
given non-place, like a transition, a temporary stay, or consumption, as mentioned 
above. Additionally, a non-place’s specificity, when it comes to the human relations 
that happen in it, can be grasped by the already-noted concepts of detachment, 
solitude, anonymity, similarity, and deindividualization. These are the features of 
non-places Augé refers to constantly, not to mention the countless commentaries 
and applications of his concept – they can be said to constitute the intersubjective 
level of non-places. They are the traits of the social environments of non-places 
that most of the people in these sites encounter and are affected by, even though 
they may assess them differently, referring to the idea of the subjective level. 
Before one can try to address this particular level of non-places in connection with 
the law, one must first comment on the second, intersubjective level.
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5.2. Non-Places’ Intersubjective Level and the Law
As previously noted, the intersubjective level of non-places concerns the 
social, interactional conditions for those who are in non-places, especially those 
who use or pass through them, but are not these non-places’ broadly understood 
staff (i.e. those who work in non-places). To be more precise, this level is about 
the distinctive feel, atmosphere, or climate in non-places of detachment, solitude, 
anonymity, sameness, and deindividualization. Those who use or pass through 
non-places, regardless of whether they are drivers on a highway, travelers in an 
airport or central railway station, motel or hotel guests, customers in a shopping 
gallery or a supermarket, or fun seekers in an entertainment park of a global 
franchise, are all within the range of this feel, but naturally each of them can 
assess that which they experience differently.
What constitutes this feel? The objective, material aspects of non-places also 
take part in its creation and maintenance; in the end, non-places are very often 
highly similar to each other, on the basis of their looks and material functionality 
alone, but one can say that a very particular atmosphere or climate in non-places 
comes from the sociality that is developed within them. In short, the ways 
people behave in non-places also create non-places. For instance, to achieve 
an environment where a specific solitude seems to be one of the predominant 
features, those who pass through it should simply behave in a highly self-centered 
way, focusing only on themselves and avoiding taking any interest in the others 
present.
However, non-places are non-places in their intersubjective, social, and 
interactional sense, not only because of what their visitors, users, or passersby 
“bring in” to them in terms of actual behaviors, but also, or even especially, 
because of what is already in non-places that visitors encounter soon after entering 
them. In other words, visitors’ actions are important in non-places, but even more 
important are the actions of those who simply work in non-places and with whom 
visitors interact the most, because they have to engage the staff to realize the 
specific goals to which these non-places are ultimately dedicated. In the end, 
senses of detachment, sameness, or deindividualization – all defining features of 
a non-place – are achieved not only through the highly standardized aesthetics 
of the building or construction, such as a lack of visual or auditory highlighting 
an ethno-cultural specificity of the region or country where the given non-place 
is located or the ubiquitous presence of global brands, their advertisements, and 
products, but also through similarly standardized ways in which non-places’ staff 
members behave with respect to visitors. Non-places can be regarded as sites 
for providing specific goods and services for clients who do not form a single, 
internally consistent (in socio-economic-demographic terms) group, but are 
actually extremely diverse. Nevertheless, those who work in non-places typically 
approach non-places’ clients in a very standardized and unified way, because 
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doing so is an element of what is professionally and even legally required of them: 
providing services of a particular quality, which is often specified in special, 
dedicated documents that are also of legal significance.
One can make such reference to the law not only in the course of explaining 
the behaviors of non-places’ staff members with respect to their broadly 
understood visitors, but also when addressing the wide array of standards 
expected to be followed by visitors themselves. As suggested above, those who 
use or pass through non-places are subjected to a plethora of visual or textual 
normative messages of explicitly legal or legal-like provenance that often are far 
more detailed and stricter than rules found outside non-places. However, the law 
also seems to play a more general, fundamental role in non-places, or at least their 
intersubjective level, that one should factor out.
The legal or legal-like rules specific to non-places that are responsible for 
their micro-jurisdictional characteristics suggested earlier, regardless of whether 
they are manifest through the actions of staff members with respect to visitors or 
through the wide array of textual, visual, displayed, or announced instructions 
or requirements addressed directly to visitors, bring all the visitors to a state 
of sameness. In the end, there is one set of normatively determined actions or 
situations involving non-places’ staff members, and an even easier to determine 
set of normative messages for the countless and significantly varied visitors. In 
consequence, if their specificity and individuality are not erased outright, they 
are certainly significantly neglected, leading to the creation of “average person” 
figures. These people are reduced to those traits deemed the most crucial for 
a particular non-place, such as the amount of money they spend or the weight of 
their luggage. People are thus deindividualized and detached.
This detachment is not only from the contexts from which people come 
and are most familiar with – these are temporarily replaced by standardized, “if 
you’ve seen one, you’ve seen them all” non-places. The detachment is also from 
others, because everyone is effectively occupied with their individual affairs and 
plans, filtered through the intricacies of the non-place – a site on which their 
affairs and plans ultimately depend. In effect, one can also speak of a peculiar 
mutual anonymization of people using or passing through non-places. Ultimately, 
everyone seems to everyone else to be similar to the blurry view outside the 
window of a moving vehicle. Such an interpretation is already justifiable in the 
face of two arguments Augé (2008, 80, 81) makes. He argues that non-places 
create a mass of single, mutually anonymized and even alienated people whose 
specificity is obscured, leading to their deindividualization and specific sameness. 
Moreover, he raises the issue of normative messages, on the basis of which non-
places function and characteristically influence those within their range. It is this 
second argument that drives the present paper.
In sum then, one can say that the sameness that is so distinctive for non-places 
is achieved through normative messages which upon even a brief examination 
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can be regarded as legal or at least legal-like. One can add to that some further 
supplements to Augé’s account, such as the issue of normative bases for actual 
behaviors of non-places’ staff members, which are also crucial to the overall non-
place experience. Moreover, the influence of specific non-place’s rules can be 
“felt” even before one actually, physically enters a non-place. To acknowledge this, 
just consider weighing a piece of luggage to comply with airlines’ requirements 
before going to the airport.
Augé’s presentation of non-places clearly and explicitly does not take into 
account subtleties like those mentioned above because of the very broad, general 
character of his analyses (in the end, Augé does not address particular kinds of 
non-places in detail) or their frequent exaggeration. For instance, he argues that 
non-places are creating a mass of individual, mutually detached people, but is this 
really always the case? In the end, one can easily imagine a scenario when a similar 
experience in a non-place is a starting point for creating a specific temporary 
community of those who have encountered the same issue and evaluated it 
similarly. More specifically, think of those passengers who have not been informed 
properly about new luggage standards and are thus made to throw away excessive 
or forbidden goods, or to pay additional fees to bring on board some of their 
belongings. Needless to say, such situations can bring different people together, 
thus demonstrating that non-places are not so devoid of some more communal, 
solidary thinking and actions, as Augé’s argumentation may suggest. However, in 
light of this paper’s aim, one should first of all stress that behind such situations 
there are still very specific legal or legal-like rules of non-places.
In most cases, when the latter function properly, they contribute to a distinctive 
feel of alienation from other people, which Augé describes. He, or those who 
wish to analyze non-places’ legal dimension further, should more fully consider 
“the opposite of the same coin” situation: what are the consequences of some 
distortions in the functioning of non-place’s characteristic rules? Augé (2008, 81) 
even suggests this direction when he makes a remark on the “individualizing 
power” of non-places (and not their default deindividualizing influence). However, 
the individualization of some previously nearly completely anonymous individuals 
can be regarded as initiated by their nonconformity with some of the rules 
functioning in non-places. In other words, in non-places, one is not oneself, but 
instead one of the many nearly identical people, as long as one follows the rules. 
Naturally, it is still possible to become oneself, for instance, a non-place’s visitor 
or passerby starts being called by his or her name by non-place’s staff members, 
but when one breaks some rule, or when something bad or unwanted happens. 
For a more specific example, consider airport intercom announcements calling 
a specific passenger who is late for boarding, or supermarket or shopping gallery 
announcements asking the owner of a car with a specific registration number 
to move it or to simply come to the security office.
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Situations like these can be seen as proof of the general, contractual (and thus 
legal or at least legal-like) relationship between visitors and non-places, which 
Augé (2008, 82) highlights. Often, one cannot even enter a given non-place without 
being compelled to follow some rules characteristic to it, not to mention one’s 
subsequent presence and functioning in the non-place, using it in accordance with 
its main function (e.g. transition, temporary stay, or consumption), while it exerts 
its influence (detachment, solitude, anonymity, sameness, and deindividualization). 
This, in connection with Augé’s (2008, 82) highly legal statement that “[i]n 
a way, the user of the non-place is always required to prove his [or her – M.D.] 
innocence,” should clearly confirm the specific paradoxical nature of non-places, 
which is dependent on their legal or legal-like rules.
To experience non-places’ ambivalent or, for some, even strictly negative 
influence on the self, one simply has to keep doing something rather positive, 
or at least neutral: follow specific rules, just like everyone else should. In non-
places, in return for “playing fair” or “going by the book” one gets something 
that not necessarily can be considered fair – detachment, solitude, anonymity, 
sameness, and deindividualization. These distinctive social, intersubjective traits 
of non-places are, to a certain yet still significant extent, dependent on non-places’ 
characteristic rules, which sometimes can be controversial and questionable 
because of their practical interference in individual privacy or even dignity. By 
contrast, breaking these rules, especially by visitors to non-places, can be said 
to reverse their default influence. For example, the previously deindividualized is 
individualized. Naturally, such nonconformity can provoke some legal or legal-
like reaction with respect to the given nonconformist, a reaction that may be more 
oppressive than the mere conformity to non-places’ legal or legal-like rules. In 
light of the above discussion, they can definitely be deemed relevant to, and in fact 
co-responsible for, the intersubjective level of non-places.
5.3. Non-Places’ Subjective Level and the Law
Augé’s presentation of non-places seems to be rather consistent, in the sense 
that he focuses on detachment, anonymity, deindividualization, and solitude. In 
consequence, often one could assume that non-places and their experience are 
negative, that people in them, especially those who do not work there, assess these 
sites and their feel and functioning unfavorably. However, one must recall that an 
individual, subjective assessment of a non-place experience does not necessarily 
have to be coherent with the general undertone of the concept, especially one 
that can be captured during the first, usually superficial, contact with Augé’s 
views. In the end, categorization and the reduction to a common denominator, so 
characteristic of non-places, can also be perceived by those who experience them 
firsthand in a positive way, such as a specific emancipation. To acknowledge this, 
consider a “stranger in a strange land” scenario. Someone who is not acquainted 
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with some of the socio-cultural peculiarities of a given area may feel insecure 
and act in a very limited way until she or he finds in that area a non-place, a site 
not influenced by local specificity unknown to him or her, but which is, instead, 
an example of the realization of globalization processes that multiply the same 
patterns and solutions in very different contexts. For such a person, even the most 
typical non-place will not be seen as ambivalent or hostile, but instead as a site of 
relief and comfort.
The example above is only one of many that can highlight the diverse (from 
very negative to very positive) individual attitudes toward or assessments of non-
places. A presentation and discussion of other examples is not necessary here. It 
is more crucial to stress that even though particular instances of non-places may 
seem meticulously designed and built at the objective level and realized at the 
intersubjective level, they still do not incapacitate their visitors’ ability to assess 
them in highly individual, and even seemingly counterintuitive, ways.
One can even venture to make an analogy to Goffmanian total institutions 
(Goffman 1961). Namely, even prisons, possibly the clearest instance of the latter, 
are not so utterly totalizing that it is impossible to create in them some degree of 
familiarity or sense of place, even for those who find themselves in them against 
their will. Similarly, non-places, despite their dedicated, function-oriented, 
objective, material traits accompanied by consistently maintained intersubjective, 
social features and influences characteristic to the sociality developed in them, 
still cannot set or determine how exactly different people will individually and 
subjectively approach them. This is simply because people’s individual attitudes 
and assessments, even with respect to the same object or phenomenon, can be and 
often are varied due to the differences among those people (for instance, cultural, 
educational, economic, occupational, or even age).
In light of the above, a question remains. How does the law relate to the 
subjective level of non-places – their diverse, individual assessments made by 
the different people who use or pass through them? Whereas the law proves to be 
relevant as co-constitutive at the objective and intersubjective levels, it would 
be unfounded to argue here that the law also takes part in the ways in which 
individuals approach non-places. As suggested earlier, their attitudes can have 
many different bases, such as broadly understood socio-demographic features. 
However, one can still hypothesize that individuals’ legal consciousnesses or 
attitudes toward the law (e.g. Hertogh 2018) can also explain the ways people 
approach non-places. For instance, someone from a mature, established liberal 
democracy and someone from an impoverished country that only recently started 
to implement democratic institutions more fully might look at the same non-
place and its legal or legal-like peculiarities differently, in accordance with how 
different their legal consciousnesses may be. Having said that, however, the law 
– in the sense used in this paper, that is, as institutionally created (mostly by state 
structures) rules – does not contribute to the subjective level of non-places.
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6. CONCLUSION
One can say that the law seems to be generally co-constitutive to non-places, 
not only in their purely material and physical aspects, as the source of regulations 
that address their mere construction or maintenance, but also in creating their 
specific intersubjective, social characteristics by clearly establishing standards 
of conduct for visitors and staff alike who, through their compliance with these 
standards, are participating significantly in the production of the distinctive non-
place’s atmosphere. However, the law does not seem to take part directly in the 
creation of individuals’ assessments of non-places, which, due to their subjective 
nature and diverse foundations, can be varied and often counterintuitive at first 
glance.
Given the different possibilities for interpreting Augé’s own account of his 
concept, the ways in which it has, to date, been understood and even applied 
for different purposes, the possibility and the need to distinguish and thoroughly 
characterize various types of non-places, and the different ways of conceptualizing 
the relationship between spatiality and rules (legal ones included) offered not only 
by legal geography, the preceding remarks are nothing more than a preliminary 
proposal for understanding the non-places–law relationship, suggested by Augé 
himself. In a way, this paper can be read as a specific invitation to begin taking 
a closer look at this relationship also from completely different perspectives than 
the very basic one employed above. Only then will we be able to decide which 
is the most accurate and useful approach. 
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